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People generally express the view that they do not want life-extending 
treatment if they become ill while severely demented. The Dutch minister of 
health, some years ago stated that in case she became demented, she would 
not want to be kept alive if she would be unable to recognize her family and 
friends (Widdershoven 2001a: 179). 
 
Those sympathetic to the view of the Dutch minister of health may argue that if they 
became severely demented or mentally incapacitated in other respects, they would 
not wish to have life-extending treatment, and to ‘die with dignity’. One possible 
way of facilitating this would be to allow ‘living wills’ or ‘advance directives’, 
whereby individuals, while still mentally competent, set out their instructions for 
treatment if they were to suffer dementia or similar incapacity (Hope, 1992, Brock 
1993). On the face of it, advance directives are to be welcomed. They appear to 
respect the autonomy and dignity of the patient, and release the patient’s family 
from agonising decisions when the patient is no longer in a position to exercise his or 
her own judgement. 
One moral philosopher who argued forcefully to be permitted to set out an advance 
directive is Soran Reader. Soran had just been diagnosed with a brain tumour and 
was advised to have a biopsy. However given the location of the tumour the biopsy 
alone would have been a highly dangerous procedure and could have killed her or 
left her severely brain damaged. As it happened the biopsy did not take place and a 
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different course of action was followed. But at the time she thought she was due for 
the operation she wrote a passionate article in the Times Higher Education 
Supplement arguing for the right to make a living will: 
 
I believe with Hannah Arendt that our first duty is to think. To face this 
surgery, I have to think the real but unbelievable possibility that when I come 
round, I may be unable to think, remember or speak. 
In all that mind-blowing horror, though, the possibility that really threatens 
to break me is that I may be unable to remember my children. I have already 
had a glimpse of life without those memories. During recent seizures, I lost 
my memories of when my daughters were born. The loss of mere dates may 
seem trivial, but the abyss it has opened to thought is terrifying, a glimpse of 
my life without my connections and my history. 
I am certain that I do not want to live on if that happens. I am terrified by the 
spectre of loss of self. But I am out of my mind with anger that my own 
country does not allow me to protect myself and my family from this horror 
safely. I am anguished at the thought that my children, on top of their grief at 
the loss of their mother, may have to cope with me as someone else, 
someone lost in the world or in a vegetative state (Reader, 2009). 
 
 
One can, I believe, have a great deal of sympathy for Soran Reader’s position. Yet 
she would be the first to emphasise that there are many different possible cases to 
consider – a range of different possible futures – and morally it is quite likely that 
they are not all on a par. 
 
The most strightforward case to think about is that in which the future person has no 
conscious mental life. This is what Soran Reader refers to as a ‘vegetative state’. Yet 
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she also contemplates a second possibility, that she survives as ‘someone lost in the 
world’. This, itself, could be interpreted in a variety of ways. Although Soran Reader 
is considering other possibilities, the different possible ways of being ‘lost in the 
world’ can be illustrated by considering people with moderate to severe Alzheimer’s 
disease and other forms of dementia. In the worst cases life is experienced primarily 
in highly negative terms. In such a state people are often confused, frustrated, 
anxious, and distressed at being unable to recognise people around them or their 
surroundings. They are unable to gain much, if any, pleasure from activity. At the 
other end of the scale are people like ‘Margo’, introduced into the literature by 
Andrew Firlik (1991) and discussed by Dworkin (1993) and Dresser (1995). Margo 
seems contented and reports enjoying reading mystery stories, and art classes, yet 
when reading appears to jump from page to page at random, and always paints the 
same picture time after time. 
 
Now it may be that Margo also has moments of torment, and it may also be that the 
majority of Alzheimer’s patients resemble both extremes: they have good days and 
bad days. However for the purposes of this paper I shall primarily discuss the 
extreme cases, as my purpose is not to give a definitive guide to the permissibility of 
advanced directives, but rather to consider the circumstances under which they may 
be particularly morally troubling.  
 
There are also other situations where living wills or advance directives are also 
relevant, such as those of temporary psychosis, especially in cases of bipolar disorder 
or schizophrenia, where one may wish to bind doctors to override treatment 
preferences expressed during a psychotic episode. These have been called ‘Ulysses 
contracts’ (Widdershoven, 2001b).  However in order to keep the current discussion 
within bounds I will leave such cases aside. But I do need to introduce one further 
situation: where a person emerges from a procedure, such as a brain operation, and 
to all appearances is capable of autonomous thought and action, but has lost 




Not only do the circumstances of the future person vary, so too does the scope of, 
possible advance directives. They can contain instructions to cover a range of 
situations. So, for example, they could cover issues that are often, if not always, 
ethically relatively uncontroversial, but personally vital, such as whether one wishes 
to be cared for at home or move to institutional care. But they can also cover 
ethically more difficult questions about whether one should receive life-extending 
treatment. This, naturally, shades into a third area, of passive euthanasia, where life-
preserving measures are withdrawn. And finally, there could be directives to carry 
out physician assisted suicide (active euthanasia) in certain circumstances.1 
 
Although there are very many other possibilities, we have simplified to a point 
where we have four states of a human being and four types of treatment options, 
which therefore generates sixteen focal types of cases that advanced directives 
could cover, as set out in the grid below: 
 
 Particular Care 
Options 











    
Conscious     
                                                        
1 In reality, of course, Alzheimer’s patients often have a co-morbidity, such as 
cancer, and sometimes their death is hastened by the use of high doses of pain 
killers in a highly ambiguous fashion, where the exact purpose of the high dose is 
not brought to the surface. However it is very hard to see how such treatment 
could explicitly be allowed for by means of an advanced directive, where, given 


















    
 
 
Roughly, as we travel from top left to bottom right of this grid, matters become 
more troubling. No objections can be made, surely, to advance directives about care 
if one were to fall into persistent vegetative state (unless the obligations on others 
were especially onerous). Yet the bottom right hand cell is the demand for active 
intervention to end the life of an autonomous person, even against their will. In 
other circumstances this would be considered simple murder. 
 
On the face of it, though, Soran Reader is arguing for the opportunity to make 
advance directives in the bottom right hand area of the grid. She maintains that does 
not want her life to continue if she emerges from the procedure ‘lost in the world’ 
unable to recognise her children. She is a step beyond – possibly two steps beyond – 
the Dutch minister who only asked to be spared life-extending treatment. Now it 
may be that Soran Reader was supposing future situations in which either she had 
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no future experience or that her future situation was one of overwhelming misery. 
But consider another case in which someone were to emerge from the procedure 
‘lost in the world’ but able to take pleasure in food and listening to music, analogous 
to the situation of Margo. Could it possibly be right that anyone should be bound by 
an advance directive to administer to her a lethal injection? Physician assisted 
suicide is clearly the most ethically difficult issue. It is currently not legal in the UK 
even for those who retain full autonomy, and so providing such a possibility as part 
of an advance directive would be a huge step. 
 
Generally, in dementia cases there are special reasons for concern. As many authors 
have noted, there is a question about the degree to which personal identity is 
preserved through the changes in mental state that can characterise dementia (e.g. 
Hope, 1992), raising the question of whether an advance directive is in effect one 
person’s decision about another person’s continued existence. There is also a 
general question about the autonomy with which advance directives are formulated. 
Presumably there are cases where setting out an advance directive is a result of 
implicit family or social pressure, rather than a real expression of values (Gastmans 
and de Lepeleire  2010, p. 83). I will leave both these considerations to one side 
here, however, as I want to pursue a different issue, about prediction and 
adaptation. I will introduce this by means of the now well-known disability paradox, 
which highlights the point that those who have not experienced a condition may well 
provide a valuation of it that is at odds with the valuation of those who do, and there 
is, therefore, a question of which valuation to use (Wolff et al 2011). 
 
Consider first a study undertaken in the early 1980s when the Department of 
Transport asked Michael Jones-Lee and associates to consider the question of how 
the negative cost of motor accident injuries should be valued. The Department 
operated with a distinction between death, serious injury and injury, and wanted to 
put a relative financial valuation on the different categories, for the purpose of 
safety cost-benefit analysis. Early on it was discovered that the department had no 
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definition of the distinction between serious and non-serious injury, and so the first 
stage of the study was to ask the public whether they regarded certain 
consequences of accidents as serious or non-serious. 
Around 1100 people were surveyed and were asked how they regarded various 
conditions.  They were asked whether they regarded them as: 
i) Not Serious 
ii) Serious but death worse 
iii) As bad as death 
iv) Slightly worse than death 
v) Much worse than death 
vi) Very much worse than death 
One might feel that there is a somewhat morbid emphasis on the degrees in which 
something can be worse than death in this schema, but in any case the results are 
interesting. The most minor condition was ‘Cut and bruised but can leave hospital 
with a couple of days and recover fully within a month.’ 81% said not serious, and 
the remaining 19% judged it serious, but not as bad as death. 
At the other end of the scale were the conditions ‘Confined to a wheelchair for the 
rest of your life’ and ‘Permanently bed-ridden’. Of these roughly half, and two-thirds, 
respectively, rated them as bad or worse than death. That is to say, only half the 
people surveyed thought it better to be confined to a wheelchair for life than dead, 
and only a third thought this of being permanently bed-ridden. (Jones-Lee, 1985, p. 
54). 
Yet, as is now well known, when we switch perspectives and ask people with serious 
disabling conditions about the quality of their life, we receive unexpected, quite 
different, answers. In a famous study Albrecht reported that more than 50% of 
people with serious disabilities report an excellent or good quality of life. This he 
terms the ‘disability paradox’. He reports that within his sample that the main cause 
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of poor quality of life is episodes of intense pain, and great fatigue, and, to some 
extent, lack of physical or mental control. 
 
The moral of this comparison is make explicit a point that has been noted in the 
literature about advance directives in dementia care: can the earlier self really think 
itself into the position of the later self? (Hope, 1992). Like the Dutch minister of 
health, many of us dread the onset of dementia, just as we would dread becoming 
permanently confined to a wheelchair. But in the latter cases the evidence is that 
many people adapt very successfully to those conditions. May that not also often be 
the case with dementia? Dementia is very often hugely demanding on carers. Is it 
also (always) so demanding on the person with dementia? 
 
Consider again the physical disability case. It may be that one of the people who in 
the Jones-Lee study rated being confined to a wheelchair as ‘very much worse than 
death’ might have written an advance directive asking for active euthanasia if this 
became their fate. Imagine now, by tragic coincidence, it does, and they are 
paralysed, believing it to be temporary. After a year in a wheelchair it becomes clear 
that the paralysis is permanent. The advance directive now applies. However, 
suppose that in that year the individual has achieved sufficient adaptation as to now 
report a good quality of life and no wish to die. Nevertheless, the doctor points to 
the advance directive and suggests that everyone is morally and legally bound to 
follow it, and active euthanasia is required. This would be the most horrifying form 
of ‘Ulysses contract’ where an earlier declaration of values and preferences is taken 
to override a later set. I take it that it is not controversial that the correct solution 
here is for the advance directive simply to be ignored, and explained away as an 
example of the difficulty of predicting how anyone will respond to future situations. 
 
Now the dementia case is not the same as this, as the person suffering from severe 
dementia will have lost the ability to make autonomous choices. They may, of 
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course, be able to express their values in other ways (Jaworska, 1999) but even if 
that is not so, they may be able to derive various forms of pleasure and enjoyment 
from life, as noted earlier. If that is so – and for as long as their life is not a torment 
to them – then to follow any advance directive that leads to an earlier death than 
might otherwise have been achieved, defers to earlier autonomous choice rather 
than current well-being. Can this be justified? 
In fact, we are very used to situations in which early choice overrides later well-
being. Many contractual situations take this form, where my previous agreement to 
do something takes precedence over my current desires. However these are 
situations where, typically, someone else is relying on my performance, and there 
are a variety of good reasons to hold people to commitments they have made to 
others. An advance directive, however, does not involve third parties in the same 
way, and if it is to be enforced in circumstances where the person has a fair quality 
of life then special reasons need to be given. 
On one view, if the person suffering from dementia is able to sustain a fair quality of 
life, this should override any advance directive that would bring about an earlier 
death than would otherwise be possible (while sustaining a decent quality of life). 
How could this be denied? Well, Jaworska has noted (without endorsing the 
reasoning) that in some cases, ‘The author of the advance directive would be 
dismayed to learn that in her demented state, a dreaded state of alienation from 
many things she now holds dear, she would have the power to overrule the well-
considered wishes she has conveyed in her directive’ (Jaworska, 1992, p. 137). Those 
pursuing this line give absolute priority to earlier, competent, self, over the later self, 
suffering from dementia. 
 
This position can receive some support by considering the question of whether one 
can be harmed after one’s death (ignoring any questions about the possibility of an 
after-life). A scientist with a highly successful career could presumably be harmed by 
the later revelation that all of his or her famous research findings were in some way 
defective. The person could also be harmed if such a thing was widely believed to be 
the case, even if it wasn’t true. Therefore one can suffer serious reputational 
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damage by things that happen after one’s death, and in at least one sense harm has 
been suffered. Therefore it is easy to see how the later self, suffering from dementia, 
can harm the earlier self, and thereby the life of the person as a whole, by acting in 
ways that bring ridicule or humiliation. Indeed dramatic depictions of the later self 
on film – think of the films Iris, based on Iris Murdoch, and The Iron Lady, based on 
Margaret Thatcher – have been accused of diminishing the life of the person, 
replacing it with a distorting picture. 
 
The earlier self may strongly wish not to be remembered in the form the later self 
will become, even if the later self generally has a contented life. On this view the 
reason for advance directives to bring about early death has nothing to do with the 
valuation of the quality of life of a person suffering from dementia, or the failure to 
project oneself into a future state. It may be fully realized that many people with 
dementia appear to be content. Rather, for some people, it is about protecting the 
integrity of a life, and not wishing to become something very different. Soran 
Reader’s reasons also included something else: the protection of her daughters from 
having to cope with someone in the world who is not recognisably their mother, but 
nevertheless their emotional, and perhaps financial, responsibility. Yet even this is 
highly troubling. How would her daughters feel if they knew that their biological, if 
not psychological, mother’s life had been brought to an end in order to spare them 
emotional distress?  
 
Advance directives to end one’s future life, even if it is of reasonably quality, are, I 
think, understandable, and not necessarily based on a false assessment of the 
quality of that life, as there are other weighty reasons to write such directives. And 
yet it seems to me very hard to justify giving priority to the earlier life, or to the well-
being of surviving relatives, however insistent and determined people are when they 
set out their advance directive. After all, even though quality of life factors may not 
have been paramount when the advance directive was composed, it is arguable that 
quality of life factors, for the person suffering from dementia, should be paramount 
in deciding whether or not to carry out the directive. This seems especially so in end-
of-life decisions, but may also be so even for decisions about care, although here 
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issues could be more finely balanced. 
 
In conclusion, some advance directives, such as over whether one’s life should end 
at home or in a hospice, seem very enlightened and helpful. Others, such as those to 
end the life of an autonomous subject, against their will, have no moral appeal and 
would rightly be ignored. As we have seen, however, there is a wide range of 
intermediate cases, where matters are less clear cut. I have argued, however, that 
given our typical lack of insight into how changes in our health condition will affect 
us in other ways, we should be very cautious indeed in promoting the use of advance 
directives in end of life decisions, at least where a reasonable quality of life remains. 
There may be some reasons for giving priority to the earlier autonomous self over a 














                                                        
2 My great thanks to Mark Schlesinger who read this paper for the journal and 
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